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Military Law-Right to Counsel at a Summary Court Martial:
Middendorf v. Henry.
In a 1972 case, Argersinger v. Hamlin," the United States Su-
preme Court held "that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no
person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty,
misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his
trial."2  The Army and Air Force considered this decision to be ap-
plicable to the military and began to provide counsel to all defendants
in summary courts-martial.3 The Judge Advocate General of the
Navy, however, disagreed with this position,4 and the Navy continued
the practice of denying appointed counsel to accused before summary
courts.' In Middendorf v. Henry6 a divided Supreme Court7 upheld
1. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). For analysis of Argersinger and its background, see
Comment, Misdemeanants" Right to Counsel: A Retrospective View of Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 9 GoNz. I REV. 169 (1973); Note, The Indigent's Expanding Right to Ap-
pointed Counsel-Argersinger v. Hamlin, 37 ALB. L. REV. 383 (1973); Note, Constitu-
tional Law-Right to Counsel-Rationale of Gideon v. Wainwright Extended to All
Criminal Prosecutions at Which Accused Is Deprived of His Liberty, 41 FOreHAM L.
Rnv. 722 (1973); Note, Criminal Law-Sixth Amendment-Right to Court-Appointed
Counsel for Indigents, 47 TurL. L. Ray. 446 (1973).
2. 407 U.S. at 37.
3. Daigle v. Warner, 490 F.2d 358, 366 (9th Cir. 1974). Courts-martial fall into
three categories: general, special, and summary. Uniform Code of Military Justice art.
16, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (1970). Article 20 of the Military Code states:
Subject to section 817 of this title [article 17], summary courts-martial have
jurisdiction to try persons subject to this chapter, except officers, cadets, avia-
tion cadets, and midshipmen, for any noncapital offense made punishable by
this chapter. No person with respect to whom summary courts-martial have
jurisdiction may be brought to trial before a summary court-martial if he ob-
jects thereto. If objection to trial by summary court-martial is made by an ac-
cused, trial may be ordered by special or general court-martial as may be ap-
propriate. Summary courts-martial may, under such limitations as thd Presi-
dent may prescribe, adjudge any punishment not forbidden by this chapter ex-
cept death, dismissal, dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, confinement for
more than one month, hard labor without confinement for more than 45 days,
restriction to specified limits for more than two months, or forfeiture of more
than two-thirds of one month's pay.
Id. § 820. Article 27 makes no provision for appointed counsel for the accused before
a summary court. Id. § 827. Instead, it is the duty of the presiding officer to protect
the interests of the accused as well as those of the Government. U.S. DEP'T OF Da-
FaNSE, MANUAL FOR COURTs-MATrmi % 79a (rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
MCM]. "The functions of a summary court-martial is to exercise justice promptly for
relatively minor offenses under a simple form of procedure." Id. Records of the pro-
ceeding and opportunity for appellate review are limited. See Uniform Code of Military
Justice arts. 54(b), 60, 65, 69, 10 U.S.C. §§ 854(b), 860, 865, 869 (1970); MCM 79e.
4. Henry v. Warner, 357 F. Supp. 495, 499 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
5. See, e.g., Middendorf v. Henry, 96 S. Ct. 1281 (1976); Betonie v. Sizemore,
496 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1974); Daigle v. Warner, 490 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Alderman, 22 C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973).
6. 96 S. Ct. 1281 (1976), rev'g Henry v. Warner, 493 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1974).
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the Navy's procedure,* stating that "neither the Sixth nor the Fifth
Amendments to the United States Constitution empower us to overtrn
the congressional determination that counsel is not required in sum-
mary courts-martial.""
Plaintiffs9 in Middendorf brought a class action suit' ° "seeking
habeas corpus (release from confinement), an injunction against future
confinement resulting from uncounseled summary courts-martial con-
victions, and an order vacating the convictions of those previously con-
victed."'1  The district court found for plaintiffs, 2 but the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals vacated this decision and remanded the case.
13
Upon the petition of both parties, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari14 and reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision.1
5
The Supreme Court analyzed the issues in Middendorf in terms
of both the sixth and fifth amendments. As the standard for the appli-
cation of the sixth amendment's right to counsel,"' the Court looked
The title of the case changed when J. William Middendorf replaced John E. Warner as
Secretary of the Navy.
7. Id. Mr. Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court, and Mr. Justice
Blackmun joified Mr. Justice Powell in a concurring opinion. A separate dissent was
filed by Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice Brennan joined Mr. Justice Marshall in
a lengthy dissent. Not taking part in the consideration or decision of the case was Mr.
Justice Stevens.
8. Id. at 1294.
9. Plaintiffs were members of either the Navy or the Marine Corps. Most had
been charged with unauthorized absence. Five men had been convicted at summary
courts-martial, including two who had intervened in the suit pursuant to FED. R. Crv.
P. 24(a)(2); three others had been ordered to stand trial. Henry v. Warner, 357 F.
Supp. 495, 497-98 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
10. Because of the Court's decision, the issues of whether FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (con-
cerning class actions) is applicable to petitions for habeas corpus and whether a district
court's injunction is enforceable outside of the court's district remain unanswered. 96
S. Ct. at 1285.
11. Id.
12. The district court ordered released all Navy and Marine Corps personnel who
had been or were to be tried by summary courts without counsel, enjoined the future
convention of such courts, and vacated plaintiffs' convictions: 357 F. Supp. at 499.
13. 493 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir." 1974). Daigle v. Warner, 490 F.2d 358 (9th Cir.
1973), held that absent military exigencies:
[C]ounsel must be appointed for the accused before a summary court-martial
only where the accused makes a request based on a timely and colorable claim
(1) that he has a defense, or (2) that there are mitigating circumstances, and
the assistance of counsel is necessary in order adequately to present the defense
or mitigating circumstances.
Id. at 365. See text accompanying notes 57-71 infra.
14. 419 U.S. 895 (1974).
15. 96 S. Ct. at 1281.
16.. The relevant portion of the sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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to Argersinger v. Hamlin'17 and drew analogies between summary
courts-martial and certain civilian proceedings held not to require coun-
sel under the sixth amendment.' 8  Noting from these instances that a
proceeding that results in confinement is not automatically classified as
a criminal prosecution,' 9 the Court then emphasized "the fact that a
summary court-martial occurs in the military community, rather than
the civilian community." 20 .The majority looked at three factors: 21 the
type of offense generally adjudicated at summary court-martial, 22 the
limited consequences of the penalties assessed for these offenses, 28 and
the non-adversary nature of the summary court-martial. 24  A combina-
tion of these factors and "the distinctive nature of military life and disci-
pine"25 led to the Court's decision that the sixth amendment's require-
ment of counsel is inapplicable to summary courts-martial because such
courts are distinguished "from the civilian misdemeanor prosecution
upon which Argersinger focused.
'26
17. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). See text accompanying note 2 supra for the holding in
that case.
18. See 96 S. Ct. at 1287-89; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation
revocation proceeding not criminal proceeding); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
(juvenile hearing that could result in confinement not criminal proceeding). Although
the sixth amendment did not apply in Gagnon, the Court did recognize that, in certain
cases, due process "will require that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent
probationers or parol6es." 411 U.S. at 790. Similarly, in Gault, the Court held that
due process requires counsel at a juvenile hearing that can assess confinement. 387 U.S.
at 34-42.
19. 96 S. Ct. at 1288-89.
20. Id. at 1289.
21. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented strongly concerning this analysis.
See 96 S. Ct. at 1297-1304.
22. The Court pointed out: "Much of the conduct proscribed by the military is
not 'criminal' conduct in the civilian sense of the word." 96 S. Ct. at 1289 (citing
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 749-51 (1974)). Most of the plaintiffs in Middendorl
were charged with "unauthorized absence," in violation of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice art. 86, 10 U.S.C. § 886 (1970), "which has no common-law counterpart and
which carries little popular opprobrium." 96 S. Ct. at 1289. Furthermore, the Court
felt that conviction of such an offense "would likely have no consequences for the ac-
cused beyond the immediate punishment meted out by the military," whereas conviction
for certain misdemeanors in civilian courts could connote "bad character." Id.
23. The Court's regard of this factor was influenced by the limited scope of penal-
ties imposable" by summary courts. 96 S. Ct. at 1290. See note 3 supra for the text
of the relevant section of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
24. The Court believed that the presiding officer's role-" 'thoroughly and impar-
tially [to] inquire into both sides of the matter and [to] insure that the interests of
both the Government and the accused are safeguarded' "--was further evidence of the
distinction between a summary court-martial and a criminal prosecution. 96 S. Ct. at
1290-91 (quoting MCM, supra note 3, at 79a). See MCM, supra note 3, at 79d for
a complete descriptitn of procedure at a summary court-martial.
25. 96 S. Ct. at 1291 n.19.
26. Id. at 1291.
1977] RIGHT TO COUNSEL 303
Moving to the requirements of the fifth amendment, the Court ob-
served that plaintiffs, who could suffer losses of liberty or property as
a result of summary court conviction, were entitled to that amendment's
guarantee of due process of law.2 7  The extent of this guarantee, how-
ever, is limited by the interests of the military regime to which plaintiffs
were subject.28  In determining the scope of military necessity that
would preclude the appointment of defense counsel at summary courts-
martial, the Court minimized the precedential value of the Court of
Military Appeals' contrary decision in United States v. Alderman 2  and
decided that the need for such counsel was not "so extraordinarily
weighty as to overcome"30 the Court's necessary deference 3' to "the
congressional determination. . that counsel should not be provided
in summary courts-martial. 32 The availability, at the accused's option,
of an alternative forum83 with counsel84 was the final major element
in the Court's decision, and the Court dismissed objections that the
choice is unconstitutional because the alternative (a general or special
court-martial) subjects the accused to the possibility of more severe
penalties.35
27. Id. The fifth amendment's due process provision is as follows: "No person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law .... .
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
28. 96 S. Ct. at 1291. Cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (pris-
oners' due process rights are subject to restrictions necessitated by the nature of the re-
gime to which they have been committed).
29. See 96 S. Ct. at 1291-92. United States v. Alderman, 22 C.M.A. 298, 46
C.M.R. 298 (1973), held that Argersinger is applicable to the military and requires
counsel at summary courts-martial. Judge Quinn wrote that Argersinger applied to mil-
itary courts just as it did to civilian courts. Id. at 300, C.M.R. at 300. Judge Duncan,
concurring in part, applied Argersinger to the military only after he found no convincing
evidence of military necessity that would preclude such application. Id. at 303, C.M.R.
at 303. In disagreement with both of these views, Chief Judge Darden dissented. Id.
at 307-08, C.M.R. at 307-08. Because only Judge Duncan dealt with the issue of mili-
tary necessity and Chief Judge Darden opposed his analysis, the majority in Middendorf
felt that the issue was not concluded. 96 S. Ct. at 1292.
30. 96 S. Ct. at 1292.
31. The Court felt obliged to defer to Congress' determination because under the
Constitution, "The Congress shall have Power ... To make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
32. 96 S. Ct. at 1291. The Court found that provision of counsel at summary
courts would "turn a brief, informal hearing . . . into an attenuated proceeding which
consumes the resources of the military to a degree which Congress could properly have
felt to be beyond what is warranted ... ." Id. at 1292.
33. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 20, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1970). See note
3 supra for the text of this section.
34. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 27, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1970).
35. 96 S. Ct. at 129'3-9 4. The Court analogized this choice to decisions faced by
defendants in civilian criminal courts. Id. See Uniform Code of Military Justice arts.
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In order to gain a complete understanding of Middendorf, it is
necessary to consider previous congressional and judicial treatment of
the -summary court-martial. Congress has twice refused to abolish the
summary court.88  Instead, in 1956, Congress provided that a defend-
ant could refuse trial before a summary court unless he had previously
rejected nonjudicial punishment.8 7  In 1968, on the second occasion,
a compromise between opponents and proponents of summary courts
broadened this right of refusal by eliminating the exception clause.88
At this time, before the Supreme Court's decision in Argersinger,
civilian defendants subject to less than six months confinement did not
enjoy the right to appointed counsel.8 9 Thus, it is highly improbable
that Congress' decisions to preserve the summary court were based
upon a determination that the demands of military necessity bar the
appointment of defense counsel in summary courts-marial.40 Indeed,
none of the courts that considered the issue prior to Middendori found
any evidence of such a determinationA'
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Middendori, three other
cases had reached either a circuit court of appeals or the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals42 with the question of Argersinger's applicability to the
military justice system.48 In Betonie v. Sizemore,44 the Fifth Circuit
accepted Argersinger as establishing "the framework for Sixth Amend-
ment analysis of military proceedings."481 The Betonie court found the
Army and Air Force acceptance of Argersinger" "[p]articularly signifi-
icant. '47  Furthermore, the opinion rejected the Navy's attempts to dis-
tinguish military from civilian criminal justice, concluding that "both the
18-19, 10 U.S.C. §§ 818-819 (1970) for penalties imposable by general and special
courts-martial.
36. 96 S. Ct. at 1292 n.21.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1303 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
40. Id..
41. See text accompanying notis 42-69 inlra.
42. The decisions of the Court of Military Appeals are final. Uniform Code of
Military Justice art. 76, 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1970).
43. Betonie v. Sizemore, 496 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1974); Daigle v. Warner, 490
F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Alderman, 22 C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298
(1973). All of these cases arose out of the same basic fact pattern: enlisted members
of the Navy and Marine Corps appealed convictions imposed in summary courts-martial
at which the men were denied the assistance of appointed counsel.
44. 496 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1974).
45. Id. at 1007.
46. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
47. 496 F.2d at 1007.
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Fifth and Sixth Amendments require counsel in any court-martial pro-
ceeding in which incarceration is to be imposed as a punishment."4
The Navy's contention that the multiple functions of the summary court
officer fulfill the requirements of the right to counsel was also rejected
as "unconvincing," 49 for as the court noted, "The potential conflicts of
interest. . . are legion." 50
In United States v. Alderman,"' the Court of Military Appeals
reached a decision quite similar to the one in Betonie. Argersinger
was held applicable to the military by Judge Quinn"2 on the basis of
the court's decision in United States v. Tempia 8 and by Judge Duncan
because he found no evidence of military necessity to preclude such
application. 54  The voluntary -acceptance of Argersinger by the Army
and Air Force also impressed Judge Duncan. 55 Additionally, Judge
Quinn noted other extensions of the right to counsel by the military
tosituations not mentioned in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 6
In Daigle v. Warner"' the Ninth Circuit used an historical ap-
proach to determine that the sixth amendment, as applied in Arger-
singer, was inapplicable to summary courts-martial. 58  This approach
relied on the asserted intentions of the framers of the Bill of Rights."
The court noted that courts-martial are required to afford an accused
due process of law under the fifth amendment.60 Then the court
48. Id. at 1008. The court relied on Argersinger's rule that prohibits the imposi-




51. 22 C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973).
52. Id. at 299, C.M.R. at 299.
53. 16 C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
54. 22 C.M.A. at 303, 46 C.M.R. at 303 (Duncan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 300, C.M.R. at 300.
57. 490 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'g 348 F. Supp. 1074 (D. Hawaii 1972). The
district court acknowledged the special attributes of nxilitary justice, but held that these
attributes "cannot justify denial of basic constitutional rights, when both these rights and
the needs of the military can be successfully accommodated. By applying Argersinger
to summary courts-martial, this court is not burdening the military with an inflexible
and impossible requirement." 348 F. Supp. at 1080.
58. 490 F.2d at 363-64.
59. The court accepted Colonel Wieners analysis. Id. at 364 (citing Wiener,
Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice I, 72 HARv. L. RE-v. 1
(1958)). For another historical approach, see Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Con-
stitution The Original Understanding, 71 HARV. L. R-v. 293 (1957), which states that
the framers did intend the sixth amendment's right to counsel to apply to the military.
60. 490 F.2d at 364.
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looked to Gagnon v. Scarpelli6' and In re Gault0 2 as guides to deter-mine the extent to which due process requires "counsel in situations
where confinement may be .imposed but the Sixth Amendment does
not apply."63  Finding the proceeding in Gagnon more analogous .to
the summary court than was the proceeding in Gault, the court held
that a modified due process right to counsel would be sufficient for
summary courts-martial.6 4 This limited due process right seems to be
a retreat from the courts' generally expanding notions of the right to
counsel.6 5 As in Alderman,66 however, the Ninth Circuit found "scant
support" for the Navy's argument that military necessity warrants the
denial of counsel to accused before summary courts. 7 Again, the
practice of the Army and Air Force was a factor in this decision. 8
Furthermore, the court felt that the Navy, by allowing private retained
counsel to appear in summary courts-martial, undermined any conten-
tion of possible harm to discipline that might result from the require-
ment of counsel. 9
Although the results of Betonie, Alderman, and Daigle reveal a
conflict,70 the common findings of the various courts are of great signif-
icance, especially in view of the Supreme Court's decision in Midden-
dorf, a case that reached that Court when the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed
Daigle in a half-page opinion.7 1  None of the lower courts found evi-
dence of military necessity that would warrant the denial of the right
to appointed counsel in summary courts-martial.72  In Middendorf,
however, the Supreme Court relied upon military necessity, as deter-
mined by Congress, as an important element in its due process analy-
61. 411 U.S. 778 (1973). Seenote 18supra.
62. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
63. 490 F.2d at 364.
64. Id. at 365-66. See note 13 supra.
65. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932); Betonie v. Sizemore, 496 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Alderman, 22 C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973).
66. 22 C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973).
67. 490 F.2d at 366. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
68. 490 F.2d at 366. See text accompanying notes 46-47 & 55 supra.
69. 490 F.2d at 366.
70. The Fifth Circuit and the Court of Military Appeals applied Argersinger to
all summary courts-martial. The Ninth Circuit's historical analysis found both Arger-
singer and the sixth amendment inapplicable to summary courts, but the court applied
the fifth amendment guarantee of due process to create a limited right to counsel in sum-
mary courts-martial. See text accompanying notes 42-69 supra.
71. Henry v. Warner, 493 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Midden-
dorf v. Henry, 419 U.S. 895 (1974).
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sis. 78  In addition to being totally inconsistent with the earlier cases,
this reliance was based on congressional actions74 that gave "no indica-
tion that Congress ever made a clear determination that 'military neces-
sity' precludes applying the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel to sum-
mary court-martial proceedings. '75  Furthermore, the Court's ac-
ceptance of the military necessity argument shows complete disregard
for the obvious meaning of the use of appointed defense counsel at
summary courts by the Army and Air Force. The acceptance like-
wise indicates an indifference to the implications that arise from the
Navy's policy of allowing the use of private retained counsel at sum-
mary courts. 76  This approach to military necessity may well indicate
the Court's willingness to accord "a grant of almost total deference to
any Act of Congress dealing with the military.
'77
Part of the Court's sixth amendment analysis78 also suffers from
an evidentiary deficiency. In 'particular, the Court's belief-that a
summary court conviction of a minor offense "would likely have no
consequences for the accused beyond the. immediate punishment meted
out by the military" 7 9 -completely ignores the possible effects of the
escalator clauses contained in the Table of Maximum Punishments of
the Manual for Courts-Martial. 0 These provisions can detonate the
"[e]xplosive [q]uality"81 of a summary court conviction by empower-
ing a later court-martial to impose considerably greater penalties than
those ordinarily authorized.8 2 The Marshall dissent raised this point,8
but the majority ignored it.
After an attack on the "flimsy factual basis" of some of the ma-
jority's observations, the Marshall dissent challenged the applicability
of two of the factors considered by the majority in its discussion of the
sixth amendment issue.8 4 " Argersinger's holding based the right to
72. See text accompanying notes 46-48, 54, 67-69 supra.
73. See notes 31-32 and text accompanying notes 29-32 supra.
74. See text accompanying notes.36-38 supra.
75. 96 S. Ct. at 1303 (Marshall & Brennan, JI., dissenting). See text accompany-
ing notes 36-40 supra.
76. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
77. 96 S. Ct. at 1304 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
78. See text accompanying notes 16-26 supra.
79. 96 S. Ct. at 1289.
80. MCM, supra note 3, at 1 127c, § B.
81. Feld, The Court-Martial Sentence: Fair or Foul?, 39 VA. L. REV. 319, 322
(1953).
82. See MCM, supra note 3, at 127c, § B.
83. 96 S. Ct. at 1299 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
84. Id.
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counsel on the possibility of confinement, without regard for the trivial
nature of the offense or the absence of consequences collateral to the
conviction.85  The majority's consideration of the latter two factors,8"
as the dissent points out, therefore conflicts with Argersinger.87
Also troublesome is the Court's implied contention that the non-
adversary nature of the summary court, as exemplified by the multiple
roles of the presiding officer, makes defense counsel unnecessary. 88
Powell v. Alabama89 rejected the notion that a judge can serve ef-
fectively as defense counsel, citing his inability to "investigate the facts,
advise and direct the defense, or participate in those necessary confer-
ences between counsel and accused which sometimes partake of the
inviolable character of the confessional."9 0  It seems extremely un-
likely that the presiding officer at a summary court-martial, who is a
layman,9' could perform these tasks in such a way that the rights of
the accused would be adequately protected.
The practical effect of Middendorf is likely to be the preservation
of the summary court-martial. Prior to Middendorf, many military law-
yers expected the Alderman"2 decision to supply such strong evidence
of the general dissatisfaction with summary courts-martial that Con-
gress would abolish. the institution."3 Now, with Middendori upholding
the constitutionality of the summary court proceeding, abolition seems
unlikely. It is presumable, furthermore, that the Army and Air Force
will abandon their practice of providing defense counsel at summary
courts-martial. If this occurs, Middendorf will have denied a prospec-
tive right to some and eradicated a realized right of others.
The preservation of summary courts-martial is undesirable be-
cause the weaknesses of the proceeding are frequently accentuated by
the absence of defense counsel. For example, the limited record of
a summary court proceeding can effectively immunize an error of the
85. Id. (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972)).
86. See notes 22-23 and text accompanying notes 21-26 supra.
87. See 96 S. Ct. at 1299 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
88. See id. at 1290-91; note 24 supra.
89. 287 U.S. 45.(1932).
90. Id. at 61, quoted in part in 96 S. Ct. at 1299-1301 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting).
91. Lermack, Summary and Special Courts-Martia An Empirical Investigation,
18 Sr. Louis U.LJ. 319, 354 (1974).
92. 22 C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973). See text accompanying notes 51-56
supra.
93. See Lermack, supra note 91, at 374 n.183, 378.
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summary .court from review.9 4  "Counsel can seek to avoid the disad-
vantage of the sparse record by requesting a verbatim transcript or by
taking detailed notes of the proceeding. Where the record is complete,
obviously the reviewer can more effectively assess the potential errors
of the summary court."9 In like manner, defense counsel can more
effectively protect the accused's ability to prepare his defense in the
face of the pressing demands of time that often characterize summary
court proceedings. 96
The negative image engendered by the summary court-martial is
another disadvantage of the institution's continued existence.97  Sum-
mary proceedings "are likely to contribute to the atmosphere of
cynicism surrounding the entire legal process." 98  If Middendorf has
the expected effect of causing the Army and Air Force to discontinue
the appointment of defense counsel in summary courts-martial, the Su-
preme Court itself will have contributed to whatever additional loss of
faith in the law results.
The Court's heavy reliance on the distinct qualities of the sum-
mary court-martial's military environment9 9 minimizes the likelihood
that the civilian community will feel Middendorf's significance as a re-
treat from the principles established in Argersinger and its antece-
dents. 100 Nevertheless, this retreat may signal. a trend for the military.
By failing to rule on the Navy's practice of allowing private retained
counsel at summary courts-martial, the Court left open the possibility
of a suit- based on concepts of equal protection.' It is improbable
that the Court would accept such an argument without a change in the
direction taken in Middendorf.
It is unfortunate that the Court departed from the holding of
Argersinger to preserve the summary court-martial, in which "one finds
the coincidence of the military accused least able to defend himself be-
ing tried by the military court most unsuited to insure legal rights
94. Fidell, The Summary Court-Martial: A Proposal, 8 HAMs. I. LrIS. 571, 586
(1971).
95. Case Comment, Right to Counsel at a Summary Court-Martial-Daigle v.
Warner, 7 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 719, 727 (1973) (citing Fidell, supra note 94, at 592).
96. See Lermack, supra note 91, at 354-55.
97. See id. at 373, 378.
98. Id. at 373.
99. See text accompanying notes 20-26 & 28 supra.
100. See cases cited in note 65 supra.
101. Cf. 96 S. Ct. at 1302 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting) (because private
retained counsel is permitted, only defendants who cannot afford to pay will be denied
counsel).
19771
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. . ,.o2 The rule that, absent a waiver, "no person may be impris-
oned. . . unless he was represented by counsel at his trial"108 could
apply to the military without undue disruption of its functions. In
reaching a contrary conclusion, the Middendorf Court over-estimated
the needs of the military and under-estimated the needs of the individ-
ual.
MARK A. STERNLICHT
Mortgages-Use of Due on Sale Clause by a Lender Is Not a
Restraint on Alienation in North Carolina
During the last seven centuries of judicial history, courts have con-
strued restraints on alienation to be contrary to public policy and there-
fore void.1 The North Carolina Supreme Court has followed this tra-
dition by consistently holding that conditions that restrain the alienation
of legal2 and equitable3 estates are void. In Crockett v. First Fed-
eral Savings & Loan Association,' however, the court altered its posi-
tion. In departing from the traditional restraints on alienation doctrine,
the court developed a new test and sustained the use of a due on sale
clause' as a valid restraint on alienation. 6 This result was reached de-
102. Note, Military Law--Courts-Martial-Recent Cases Defining the Right to
Counsel Before Summary Courts-Martial, 1975 B.Y.U.L. l~v. 285, 292-93.
103. 407 U.S. at 37.
1. The Statute of Quia Enptores, 18 Edw. 1, cc. 1-3, was enacted in 1290.
Under this statute the doctrine of subinfeudation was limited by prohibition of feudal
tenures in a fee simple estate. L. Sim.s & A. SMITH, THE LAw OF FuTuRE INTER-
Esrs § 15 (2d ed. 1956). This statute laid the basis for many of the common law
doctrines dealing with restraints on alienation.
2. Brooks v. Griffin, 177 N.C. 7, 97 S.E. 730 (1919); Latimer v. Waddell,
119 N.C. 370, 26 S.E. 122 (1896).
3. E.g., Lee v. Oates, 171 N.C. 717, 88 S.E. 889 (1916).
4. 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976).
5. Mortgages that contain a due on sale clause permit the lender to withhold
consent to possible transfers by the mortgagor. A mortgagor who seeks to alienate
his property without the lender's consent faces the possible exercise of the clause by
the lender. An exercise will force acceleration of the existing note and all principal
will be due on the note at the time of sale. The clause used in Crockett reads:
[Or if property herein conveyed is transferred without the written assent of
the Association, then in all or any of said events the full principal sum with
all unpaid interest thereon shall at the option of Association, its successors or
assigns, become at once due and payable without further notice and irrespective
of the date of maturity expressed in said note.
Id. at 622, 224 S.E.2d at 582.
6. Id. at 630-31, 224 S.E.2d at 587.
